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Abstract
Traditional models of bank runs do not allow for herding e¤ects, because in these
models withdrawal decisions are assumed to be made simultaneously. I extend the banking
model to allow a depositor to choose his withdrawal time. When he withdraws depends
on his liquidity type (patient or impatient), his private, noisy signal about the quality of
the banks portfolio, and the withdrawal histories of the other depositors. In some cases,
the optimal banking contract permits herding runs. Some of these runsare e¢ cient in
that the bank is liquidated before the portfolio worsens. Others are not e¢ cient; these
are cases in which the herd is misled.
JEL Classication Numbers: C73, D82, E59, G21.
Keywords: Bank runs, herding, imperfect information, perfect Bayesian equilibrium,
optimal bank contract, sequential-move game, fundamental-based bank runs.
1 Introduction
In the classic bank-runs model of Diamond and Dybvig (1983), individual withdrawal
decisions are made simultaneously. The lack of detailed dynamics of withdrawals makes
it di¢ cult to explain some observed features of bank runs. In reality, at least some
withdrawals are based on the information about the previous withdrawals of others2.
1I would like to thank Levon Barseghyan, Pablo Becker, David Easley, Edward Green, Ani Guerdjikova,
Todd Keister, Tapan Mitra, Assaf Razin, Fernando Vega-Redondo, Tao Zhu and seminar participants
at the Cornell Macro Workshop and Cornell-Penn State Macro Workshop for insightful comments. I
am especially grateful to Karl Shell for numerous discussions and helpful guidance. All remaining errors
are my own. Correspondence: Department of Economics, University of Missouri, Columbia, MO 65293,
USA. Email: guc@missouri.edu.
2Brunnermeier (2001) says that ...withdrawals by deposit holders occur sequentially in reality, [while]
the literature typically models bank runs as a simultaneous move game.
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During the 1994-1995 Argentine banking crisis, large depositors were responsible for most
of the deposit outows at the beginning of the crisis. Small depositors began to make
substantial withdrawals two months later3. In their analysis on the runs on Turkish
special nance houses (SFHs)4 in 2001, Starr and Yilmaz (2007) nd that depositors
made sequential withdrawals inuenced by the history of the withdrawals of others. The
authors argue that the increased withdrawals by moderate-size accountholders tended
to boost withdrawals by [their] small counterparts, suggesting that the latter viewed the
former as informative with respect to the SFHs nancial condition.
In the present paper, I build a model in which the timing of individual withdrawals
is determined by the depositors information about his consumption type (patient, which
means he does not need to consume immediately, or impatient, which means he needs to
consume immediately), his noisy signal about the quality of the banks portfolio, and the
observed withdrawal history of other depositors. In my model, the signals are received
in an exogenously determined sequence, but the timing of withdrawal is endogenously
determined5. Because ones simple withdraw-or-not action does not reveal perfectly to
others the pair of private signals that the depositor receives, other depositors can only
imperfectly extract the depositors private signals from his action. They update their
beliefs about the quality of the banks portfolio accordingly.
This paper does not focus on the panic-based bank runs of Diamond and Dybvig
(1983). (See also Peck and Shell (2003).) I focus instead on bank runs which occur as a
result of depositors trying to extract information about bank portfolio quality from the
withdrawal histories of others. Because signals about the fundamentals are imperfect, and
because signal extraction from the observed withdrawal history is also imperfect, a bank
run can occur when the bank fundamentals are strong. In particular, it can occur when
too manydepositors receive early liquidity shocks. A bank run due to imperfect signal
extraction is unique to the model with non-simultaneous withdrawal decisions. Bank runs
in this sense are not purely fundamental-based. Compare my model with Allen and Gale
3See Schumacher (2005).
4Special nancial houses are like commercial banks, but their deposits are not insured.
5Chari and Kehoe (2003) are the rst to introduce a model of herding in investment decisions with
endogenous timing.
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(1994) and Goldstein and Pauzner (2005), etc.
I show that there is a perfect Bayesian equilibrium in which a depositor withdraws if
his expected utility is below his threshold level, and otherwise he waits. A depositors
expected utility depends upon his beliefs about the quality of the banks portfolio, which
are recursively updated by the observed withdrawal history of the other depositors. Before
a depositors beliefs become su¢ ciently favorable, he follows his private signals: If he is
impatient or the portfolio signal is unfavorable, he withdraws; otherwise he waits. A bank
run occurs as a result of a herd of withdrawals when all depositors withdraw because
of unfavorable signals and/or unfavorable observations on withdrawals. If his belief is
su¢ ciently favorable, the private signal received by the depositor will not be decisive: the
depositor always waits to withdraw unless he is impatient. In this case, his private signal
will not be revealed through his withdrawal behavior, so his withdrawal behavior does
not a¤ect othersbeliefs nor their expected utilities. A no-bank-runregime thus takes
place as a result of a herd of non-withdrawals.
Compared with herding in investment decisions (Banerjee (1992), Bikhchandani et
al (1992), and more recently Chari and Kehoe (2003, 2004)), herding in bank runs has
some special features that complicate the model and lead to interesting results. The
most important di¤erence lies in the payment inter-dependence and uncertainty. In the
banking setup, a depositors payo¤ depends not only on his own actions, but also on the
actions of others. The uncertainty in future payo¤s in particular, whether a bank run
occurs or not adds additional risk to the depositors decision-making. This uncertainty
is not necessarily bad, because a run can force the bank to liquidate assets before low
productivity is actually realized, i.e., before a higher welfare cost is incurred.
An interesting result due to payment inter-dependence and uncertainty is the possibil-
ity that the expected utility is not monotone in the depositors beliefs and the possibility
that his threshold beliefs are not unique. If a bank run takes place when depositors
aggregate expected utility, or social welfare, would be lower if there would be no bank
run due to the low probability of having a high return, then the bank run serves as a
lower bound on social welfare. Information about production is valuable in this situation.
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Though a more favorable level of beliefs makes a depositor more condent in the quality
of banks portfolio, it is also more likely to lead to a herd of non-withdrawals where no
more information will be made available in the future. Hence, expected utilities might
not be increasing in the probability that the portfolio is good. As a result, the uniqueness
of the threshold beliefs in the traditional herding literature is not guaranteed.
Computed examples show that in some economies a run-admitting contract is optimal
because it not only provides more liquidity to the depositors to insure against liquid-
ity shocks, but it also encourages depositors to reveal the signals they receive. In other
economies, a run-proof contract is optimal as it protects the economy from costly unde-
sirable bank runs. Herding runs are equilibrium phenomena when the risk of bank runs
or cost is su¢ ciently small. Compare my herding runs with the somewhat similar results
of Peck and Shells (2003) on panic-based bank runs.
This remainder of the paper is organized as follows: The model is introduced in Section
2. In Section 3, I describe the equilibrium for an arbitrary demand-deposit contract.
A perfect Bayesian Nash equilibrium is shown to exist. In section 4, I calculate some
examples of optimal demand-deposit contract. I o¤er in the nal section some concluding
observations.
2 Model Set-up
Time: There are three periods, t = 0; 1; 2 (period 0, 1 and 2, respectively). t = 0 is a
planning period, which is called ex ante. t = 1 and t = 2 are ex post. Period 1 is divided
into N + 1 stages. N is a nite integer.
Depositors: There is a measure 1 of depositors in the economy. Each depositor is
endowed with 1 unit of the consumption good in period 0. Depositors are identical at t = 0,
but they face consumption shocks at t = 1. If a depositor receives a consumption shock,
he is called impatient and has to consume immediately. An impatient depositors utility
is given by u(c1), where c1 is the consumption received at t = 1. If a depositor does not
receive a consumption shock, his consumption type is patient. Patient depositors derive
4
utility from the consumption in the last period. If a patient depositor receives consumption
at t = 1, he can reinvest it in a storage technology privately and consume it at t = 2.
Thus, a patient depositors utility is described by u(c1+ c2), where c2 is the consumption
received at t = 2. u(x) is strictly increasing, strictly concave, and twice di¤erentiable.
The coe¢ cient of relative risk aversion of the utility function,  xu00(x)=u0(x), is greater
than 1 for x  1. The utility function is normalized to 0 at x = 0, i.e., u(0) = 0. Each
depositor has probability  (0 <  < 1) to be impatient and probability 1    to be
patient. By the law of large numbers, a proportion  of the depositors is impatient.
Storage: Depositors can store the consumption good at no cost.
The bank and its technology: The bank takes deposits from depositors and invests
in a production project. Production is risky and rigid. The investment in production can
only be made in the initial period. One unit of consumption good invested at t = 0 yields
R units at t = 2. R = R > 1 with probability p0, and R = R  1 with probability 1  p0.
The production asset can be liquidated at t = 1. Either all or none must be liquidated.
The project can therefore be treated as an indivisible goodafter it is started. I assume
an individual depositor cannot invest in production on his own.
The contract: For convenience, I assume that if a depositor decides to deposit at the
bank, the minimum amount of the deposit is 1 unit of consumption good. A competitive
bank o¤ers a simple demand-deposit contract that describes the amount of consumption
goods paid to the depositors who withdraw in periods 1 and 2, c1 and c2 respectively.
c1 is independent of the productivity state. c2 is state contingent. The bank pays c1
to the depositors at t = 1 until it is out of funds. If the amount of consumption good
in storage cannot meet the withdrawal demand, the bank has to liquidate assets. The
bank distributes the remaining resource plus or minus the return on the portfolio equally
among the depositors who wait until the last period. Denote the fraction of deposits that
the bank keeps in storage by , and the fraction of depositors who withdraw deposits in
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period 1 by  (0    1). The payment to the depositors who withdraw in period 2 is
c2 =
8>>>>><>>>>>:
  c1 + (1  )R
1   if c
1  ;
1  c1
1   if  < c
1  1;
0 if c1 > 1:
Because at least a fraction  of the depositors need to consume at t = 1,  must at
least be c1. In the situation that the bank cannot meet payment requirements at t = 1,
the bank fails. Because c2 is dependent on the choice of c1 and ; the demand-deposit
contract can therefore be described by (c1; ) :
Withdrawal stages and Information: In each of the rst N stages of t = 1, only
one depositor is informed of his consumption type. Information about consumption is
precise. He also receives a signal about the productivity of the bank portfolio. The signal
about production status is accurate with probability q, q > 0:5. That is,
Pr(Sn = HjR = R) = Pr(Sn = LjR = R) = q:
Sn denotes the signal about productivity obtained by the depositor who is informed at
stage n. Given productivity status, the probability of receiving a correct signal is q.
Receiving a signal, a depositor updates his belief about productivity by Bayes rule. The
common initial prior is p0. At stage N + 1; all depositors who have not received signals
are informed of their consumption types, but no signal about productivity. An impatient
depositor has to consume at the stage when he receives the consumption shock.
Depositors have equal opportunity to be informed at each stage. Because N is tiny
compared with the innite number of depositors, the probability of getting informed in
the rst N stages is zero. Depositors do not communicate with each other about the
signals they receive. However, a depositors withdrawal action is observed by all others.
Once a depositor withdraws, he cannot reverse his decision. But if a depositor chooses to
wait, he can withdraw at a later stage. The nal deadline for depositors to withdraw at
t = 1 is stage N +1. Depositors are not allowed to change decisions after observing other
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depositorsdecisions at stage N + 1.
There are four types of depositors at each of the rst N stages. The rst type are those
who have already withdrawn their deposits from the bank. Those are inactive depositors
who have no more decisions to make. The second type is the newly informed depositor
who receives signals at current stage. The third type are those who were previously
informed but have been waiting. The rest are the uninformed depositors.
The rigidity in liquidation of long-term assets imposes di¢ culty for the bank to adjust
its portfolio at t = 1 by varying the fraction of assets in production. The bank does not
have private information about productivity. It is in the same position as an uninformed
depositor in terms of information. The bank does not liquidate the assets unless it is
forced to do so when a bank run occurs.
A nite number of stages is necessary because it imposes a deadline to the deposi-
tors to make decisions at t = 1, so the expected utility can be calculated by backward
induction. The specication of a continuum of depositors tremendously simplies cal-
culation. Consider a model that has a nite number of depositors. Each depositor has
an non-atomic share at the bank. Seeing a depositor withdraw his funds, the rest need
to re-calculate their payo¤s in di¤erent productivity states as the amount of remaining
resource at the bank has changed signicantly. The description of the equilibrium will be
dependent on the parameters of the economy, and there will be many more cases to dis-
cuss. In the appendix, I present a simple example of a two-stage, two-depositor economy.
Similar results are obtained in the example.
The sequence of timing of the banking game is as follows.
t = 0 :
Bank announces the contract;
Depositors make deposit decision.
t = 1 :
Stage 1:
One depositor receives signals about his consumption type and about productivity.
He decides whether to withdraw or not.
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Other depositors decide whether to withdraw or not.
(repeat for N stages)
Stage N + 1 :
Consumption types are revealed to those who are not informed.
Depositors decide whether to withdraw or not.
t = 2 :
Bank allocates the remaining resource to the rest of the depositors.
The post-deposit game starts after depositors make deposits at the bank. An individ-
ual depositor decides when to withdraw from the bank. Knowing what depositors will be
doing in the post-deposit game, the bank o¤ers a competitive contract that maximizes
the ex-ante expected utility of the depositors at t = 0. Depositors determine whether to
deposit at the bank or stay in autarky. Starting at t = 0, the entire game is called the
pre-deposit game. I start with the analysis in the post-deposit game. I rst prove that
in the post-deposit game, there exists a perfect Bayesian equilibrium given a contract.
Then I will calculate some examples of the optimal contract that the bank o¤ers in the
pre-deposit game given the equilibrium strategies in the post-deposit game.
3 Post-Deposit Game
In Diamond and Dybvig (1983), a demand-deposit banking contract allows for a panic-
based bank run in the post-deposit game given c1 > 1. For convenience, the panic-based
run is not considered in the present paper. A bank run occurs in my model solely due
to the information about the productivity or the imperfect extraction of the information
from the actions of other depositors.
LetXn denote the total number of withdrawals at stage n. The history of withdrawals,
hn = (X1; X2; :::; Xn), publicly records the number of withdrawals at each stage up to stage
n. The history of depositor i who receives a signal at stage r is hi;n = (hn; sr; r). The
history of an uninformed depositor is hi;n = (hn;?;?).
The strategies xi;n (hi;n) is a sequence of functions that map the history of depositor i
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into zero-one withdrawal decisions at stage n. Let xi;n (hi;n) = 1 represent the decision to
withdraw, and let xi;n (hi;n) = 0 represent the decision to wait. The beliefs pi;n (hi;n) is a
sequence of functions that map the history of depositor i into the probabilities that the
productivity is high at stage n. At stage n, the newly informed depositors belief is the
belief as an uninformed depositor at stage n   1 updated by the signal he receives. The
belief of an uninformed or of a previously informed depositor is based on his observation
on the number of withdrawals in each stage up to n. Uninformed depositors have the
same history. Their beliefs are the same.
To simplify the notation, let xUn and p
U
n denote the strategy and belief of an uninformed
depositor at stage n; respectively. Let xSrn and p
Sr
n denote the strategy and belief of a
depositor who is informed at stage r of a productivity signal Sr, respectively. If r = n,
the depositor is newly informed. Otherwise, he is previously informed.
In order to show how withdrawals by some depositors a¤ect the beliefs and actions
of the others, I am interested in nding an equilibrium in which the newly informed
depositors are willing to make decisions according to the signals that they receive under
some conditions. I consider symmetric pure strategies. That is, depositors with the same
history adopt the same pure strategy at each stage. I will discuss equilibrium according
to whether c1 is greater than 1 or not. For a contract that o¤ers c1 < 1, there does not
exist a symmetric pure strategy equilibrium in which all depositors withdraw in period 1,
because if all other depositors withdraw, an individual depositor can expect to obtain an
innite amount of consumption goods in period 2 by choosing to wait.
3.1 Equilibrium Given c1  1
3.1.1 Bayesian Updates
A newly informed depositor at stage n Bayesian updates his belief by the productivity
signal that he receives. His prior at stage n is his posterior at the stage n   1 when he
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was an uninformed depositor.
pSnn =
8>><>>:
PH(p
U
n 1) =
pUn 1q
pUn 1q + (1  pUn 1)(1  q)
; if Sn = H;
PL(p
U
n 1) =
pUn 1 (1  q)
pUn 1(1  q) + (1  pUn 1)q
; if Sn = L:
PH and PL denote the rules of Bayesian updates when a high or a low signal is received,
respectively. p  PH (p)  1 and 0  PL (p)  p for p 2 [0; 1]. PH (p) and PL (p) are
strictly increasing in p.
The uninformed and previously informed depositors update their belief about the
productivity being high by observing the decision made by the newly informed depositor.
Suppose that the newly informed depositor waits if and only if a high signal is received
and he is patient. The uninformed depositors then update their beliefs by
pUn =
8>><>>:
PH(p
U
n 1) =
pUn 1q
pUn 1q + (1  pUn 1) (1  q)
, if the newly informed waits;
PeL(pUn 1) = p
U
n 1 (1  q + q)
+ (1  ) pUn 1(1  q) +  1  pUn 1 q , if the newly informed withdraws.
PeL denotes the Bayesian update where the probability of observing an impatient
depositor is taken into account. 0  PL (p)  PeL(p)  p for p 2 [0; 1] : Note that
P n1H

P n2eL (p

= P n2eL (P n1H (p)), where the power on PeL (or PH) denotes the number of up-
dates by PeL (or PH), given the prior. So long as depositors update their beliefs by the
same numbers of PH and PeL, their beliefs are the same, no matter at which stages these
updates have occurred. A previously informed depositor updates his prior in the same
way.
Suppose the newly informed does not make decisions according to his signal about
productivity. In this case, the uninformed and the previously informed depositors do not
change their beliefs because the decision of the newly informed carries no information
about the productivity. Therefore, pUn = p
U
n 1, and p
Sr
n = p
Sr
n 1 for r < n.
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3.1.2 Expected Utility at Stage n
By the assumption of symmetric pure strategies, either all uninformed depositors with-
draw or none of them withdraws at stages before N+1. If a depositor withdraws while all
other uninformed depositors do not, he will get c1 denitely. If all uninformed depositors
withdraw, an individual depositor who also withdraws has a chance of 1
c1
to receive c1. In
this case, the expected utility from withdrawing immediately is 1
c1
u (c1).
The expected utility of a depositor who does not withdraw at stage n is more com-
plicated. The expected utility obviously depends on his current belief. Furthermore, it
depends on how other depositors behave at future stages. I start with stage N to illustrate
this. The expected utility here refers to the expected utility from optimal decisions at
each stage.
Let u1 = u (c1) ; u2 = u

 c1+(1 )R
1 

; and u2 = u

 c1+(1 )R
1 

. u2 and u2
represent a patient depositors utility in t = 2, depending on the realization of production,
if there is no bank run t = 1. I suppress (c1; ) because c1 and  are given in the post-
deposit game. Dene the cuto¤ belief, p^, as follows:
u1 = p^u2 + (1  p^)u2. (1)
p^ is a function of (c1; ). p^ is the cuto¤ belief with which a patient depositor is indi¤erent
between withdrawing immediately and waiting until the last period if no information
about productivity is available. Note that given c1  1 and R  1, we always have p^  0.
p^ = 0 if and only if c1 = R = 1 or c1 =  = 1. Let p denote PH (p^), and p denote PL (p^).
Suppose that the uninformed depositors have the posterior belief pUN at the end of
stage N . They will not get information about productivity at stage N + 1. Therefore,
pUN is an uninformed depositors nalized belief. If p
U
N  p^, an uninformed depositors
will wait for period 2 unless he is told to be impatient at stage N + 1. Otherwise, he
will withdraw regardless of the actions of the other depositors. By symmetric strategies,
each depositor has a chance of 1
c1
to get paid given c1  1. The expected utility of an
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uninformed depositor at the end of stage N is
wUN
 
pUN

=
8<: u1 + (1  )

pUNu2 +
 
1  pUN

u2

, if pUN  p^;
1
c1
u1, otherwise.
(2)
How about an uninformed depositors expected utility at an arbitrary stage n? Sup-
pose the newly informed depositor follows a simple rule: he withdraws if and only if his
posterior at stage n is below the cuto¤ level p^, or he is impatient. A newly informed
depositor was an uninformed depositor the stage before. So the uninformed depositors
and the newly informed depositor share the same prior at current stage. Knowing the
newly informed depositors decision rule, an uninformed can update his belief according
to the newly informed depositors actions. His expected utility is also updated with his
beliefs accordingly. Dene the expected utility of an uninformed depositor at stage n < N
in a recursive way:
wUn
 
pUn

=
8>>>>>>>>><>>>>>>>>>:
u1 + (1  )

pUnu2 +
 
1  pUn

u2

, if pUn  p;

 
pUn

wUn+1
 
PH
 
pUn

+ if p  pUn < p and
+(1    pUn )wUn+1  PeL  pUn  ,   pUn wUn+1  PH  pUn + (1    pUn )
 wUn+1
 
PeL  pUn   u1;
1
c1
u1, otherwise,
(3)
where
 (p) = (1  ) [(1  p) (1  q) + pq] (4)
is the probability that the depositor informed at next stage receives a high signal and is
also patient, given the posterior of p at the current stage.
If the prior at stage n + 1 is very high (very low), i.e., pUn  p (pUn < p), even though
a low (high) signal is received, the newly informed depositors posterior belief at stage
n+1 is still above (below) the critical level of p^. So the newly informed depositor will not
withdraw (wait). The newly informed depositors action does not carry information about
his signal, so the beliefs of the uninformed depositors will not change. From then on, no
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more information can be inferred from the decisions by the newly informed depositors at
future stages. According to their current belief, the expected utility of an uninformed
depositor in the last period is u1+(1  )

pUnu2 +
 
1  pUn

u2

, which is greater (lower)
than u1 as pUn  p (pUn < p).
Suppose the newly informed depositors prior is moderately high. If a low signal is
received, the posterior belief falls below p^; while if a high signal is received, the posterior
belief is above p^. When the newly informed waits, his decision fully reveals that he
gets a high signal. The belief of the uninformed depositors will be updated to the same
level as the newly informed depositor. While if a withdrawal is observed, an uninformed
depositors belief will be updated by P~L. The expected utility of an uninformed depositor
at the current stage is the weighted average of the possible expected utilities at next stage,
where the weights are the probabilities that his current belief will be updated by either
PH or P~L at next stage. Whether an uninformed depositor decides to withdraw depends
on whether the weighted average exceeds u1.
3.1.3 A Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium
The expected utility of an uninformed depositor dened by (2)   (4) depends on the
conjecture that the newly informed depositor withdraws if his posterior is lower than
p^, and waits otherwise. In this section, I will show that the conjecture is part of the
equilibrium. I will also illustrate the equilibrium strategies and belief update rules of all
active depositors.
Dene a previously informed patient depositors expected utility as
wSrN
 
pSrN

=
8<: max

pSrN u2 +
 
1  pSrN

u2; u1
	
; if wUN
 
pUN
  u1;
1
c1
u1, otherwise.
(5)
wSrn
 
pSrn

=
8>>>>>><>>>>>>:
pSrn u2 +
 
1  pSrn

u2, if p
U
n  p;
maxf  pSrn wSrn+1  PH  pSrn + if p  pUn < p and
+
 
1    pSrn wSrn+1  PeL  pSrn  ; u1g; wUn  pUn   u1;
1
c1
u1, otherwise.
(6)
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for 1  n < N; r < n: The expected utility of a previously informed depositor is dened
in the same way as that of an uninformed depositor. A previously informed depositor is
patient, otherwise he should have withdrawn already. He knows the beliefs of the unin-
formed depositors, and he can predict whether the uninformed depositors will withdraw
or not. As the uninformed are of measure 1, when they withdraw, a previously informed
should also do so, otherwise he will be left unpaid. Therefore, the expected utility of a
previously informed depositor is conditional on whether the uninformed depositors with-
draw or not. Also note that the expected utility of a previously informed depositor only
depends on his current belief. His private history path does not matter. If r = n, (5) (6)
denes a newly informed depositors expected utility if he is patient.
For 1  n  N , a newly informed depositors strategy is
xSnn =
8<: 1, if impatient or pSnn < p^.0, otherwise. (7)
For 1  n  N , an uninformed depositors strategy is
xUn =
8<: 1, if wUn
 
pUn

< u1.
0, otherwise.
(8)
For 1  n  N , a previously informed depositors strategy is (r < n)
xSrn =
8<: 1, if wSrn
 
pSrn

< u1.
0, otherwise.
(9)
For n = N + 1, an active depositors strategy is
xN+1 =
8<: 1, if impatient or pN+1 < p^.0, otherwise. (10)
If no one else makes a withdrawal, the belief of a newly informed depositor at stage n
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(1  n  N) is updated by the signal he receives
pSnn =
8<: PL(pUn 1), if Sn = L;PH(pUn 1), if Sn = H; (11)
with pU0 = p0: If anyone else makes a withdrawal, p
Sn
n = 0:
The belief of an uninformed depositor at stage 1  n  N is updated by
pUn =
8>>>>>><>>>>>>:
0, if Xn > 1; or (Xn = 0 and pUn 1 < p);
PeL(pUn 1), if Xn = 1, p  pUn 1 < p;
PH(p
U
n 1), if Xn = 0, p  pUn 1 < p;
pUn 1, otherwise.
(12)
with pU0 = p0:
The belief of a previously informed depositor at stage 1  n  N is updated by
(r < n)
pSrn =
8>>>>>><>>>>>>:
0, if Xn > 1; or (Xn = 0 and pUn 1 < p);
PeL(pSrn 1), if Xn = 1; p  pUn 1 < p;
PH(p
Sr
n 1), if Xn = 0; p  pUn 1 < p;
pSrn 1, otherwise.
(13)
At stage N + 1; an active depositors belief is equal to his belief at stage N: That is,
pN+1 = pN .
A newly informed depositor updates his belief by PH or PL if no other withdrawals are
observed. If other depositors withdraw, his belief drops to 0; and he will withdraw if p^ > 0.
Thus, at least two withdrawals occur at the current stage. The beliefs of the uninformed
depositors also drop to 0, and they also withdraw. If p^ = 0; depositors always prefer to
wait even though deviations are detected. If pUn 1 < p; the newly informed at stage n is
supposed to withdraw even if he receives a high signal (although in equilibrium, there is
no active depositor with beliefs lower than p). If he does not withdraw, the uninformed
depositors detect the deviation, and their beliefs become 0.
Before the equilibrium is proved, I rst introduce the denitions of a herd of with-
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drawals and a herd of non-withdrawals.
Denition 1 A herd of non-withdrawals begins when (1) the newly informed depositor
does not withdraw deposits unless he is impatient even though a low signal on productivity
is received, and (2) all other depositors wait until their consumption types are revealed to
be impatient.
Denition 2 A herd of withdrawals begins when all depositors withdraw deposits.
The logic behind the proof of the equilibrium is similar to Chari and Kehoe (2003).
However, due to the fact that the payo¤s of the depositors are dependent on each others
action, and that the liquidity type is private, the following lemmas are needed to establish
the properties of an active depositors expected utility function at any stage. I will discuss
the properties of an uninformed depositors expected utility function according to whether
the contract satises the high cuto¤probabilitycondition or the low cuto¤probability
condition. The meaning of the conditions will become clear at the end of this section.
Denition 3 Dene a cuto¤ probability of wUn (p) as follows: ~pn is a cuto¤ probability
if there exist "1; "2 > 0 such that wUn (p)  u1 for p 2 [~pn; ~pn+ "1]; and wUn (p) < u1 for
p 2 [~pn  "2; ~pn; ).
High Cuto¤ProbabilityCondition: u1+(1  )

PeL (p^)u2 +  1  PeL (p^)u2 >
1
c1
u1:
Low Cuto¤ProbabilityCondition: u1 + (1  )

PeL (p^)u2 +  1  PeL (p^)u2 
1
c1
u1:
The left-hand side of the high/low cuto¤ probability condition is an uninformed
depositors expected utility with belief PeL (p^) at stage N if no bank run occurs. The
right-hand side is his expected utility when a bank run occurs.
Lemma 1 Consider a contract that pays c1  1 and satises the high cuto¤ probability
condition. For each stage 0  n  N; wUn (p) is increasing in p: There exists a unique
cuto¤ probability ~pn such that wUn (p)  u1 for p 2 [~pn; 1]; and wUn (p) =
1
c1
u1 for p 2
[0; ~pn): ~pn is decreasing in n: wUn (p)  u1 + (1  ) [pu2 + (1  p)u2] for p 2 [~pn; 1]:
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Proof. Prove by induction. See appendix.
Lemma 1 says if the dened wUn (p) is the expected utility of an uninformed depositor in
the equilibrium and the high cuto¤ probabilitycondition is satised, there is a unique
cuto¤ belief at each stage above which the uninformed depositors are willing to wait,
below which they will withdraw.
Lemma 2 Consider a contract that pays c1  1 and satises the low cuto¤ probability
condition. wUn (p)  u1 on [p^; 1] :
Proof. See appendix.
Lemma 2 says that if wUn (p) is the expected utility of the uninformed depositors in
the equilibrium and the low cuto¤ probabilitycondition holds, depositors are willing to
wait if their beliefs are above p^. In other words, the cuto¤ probabilities of ~pn are lower
than p^ for stages before N .
Corollary 1 Consider a contract that pays c1  1. Given a posterior of p at stage n; if
wUn (p)  u1; then wUn+1 (PH (p))  u1:
Proof. See appendix.
Corollary 1 has the following implication: Given c1  1, assume an uninformed de-
positor is willing to wait the stage before. He is also willing to wait at the current stage
assuming a high signal is inferred. If a newly informed depositors decision of waiting
conveys a high signal to the uninformed depositors, his decision will not trigger a bank
run.
Example 1:
Figure 16 shows an example of wUn (p) where the high cuto¤ probabilitycondition
holds.
u (c) = (c+b)
1  b1 
1  ; b = 0:001;  = 1:01: R = 1:5; R = 1; p0 = 0:9: q = 0:999:
 = 0:01.
Let c1 = 1:04, and  = c1 = 0:0104: u2 = 7:5568; u2 = 7:1525; u1 = 7:1921:
6In all gures in this paper, solid thin line represents u1 + (1   ) [pnu2 + (1  pn)u2] ; solid thick
line represents wUn ; and dash line represents u1:
17
In this example, epN = p^ = 0:0978; epn = 0:4383 for n = N   1; N   2; :::1:
Example 2:
Figure 2 shows an example of wUn (p) where the low cuto¤ probability condition
holds.
u (c) = (c+b)
1  b1 
1  ; b = 0:001;  = 1:01: R = 1:5; R = 0:8; p0 = 0:9: q = 0:9:
 = 0:01.
Let c1 = 1:011;  = c1 = 0:0101: u2 = 7:5571; u2 = 6:9297; u1 = 7:1629:
In this example, there exist unique cuto¤ probabilities at stages N , N   1, N   2,
and N   100, above which wUn (p) is greater than u1, below which wUn (p) is less than u1.epN = p^ = 0:3716; epN 1 = 0:2032; epN 2 = 0:1971; epN 100 = 0:1783: However, the cuto¤
probability is not always unique. We will see an example of non-uniqueness later. Also
note that wUn (p) is not necessarily increasing in p:
Lemma 3 If pUn = p
Sr
n ; and w
U
n
 
pUn
  u1; then wSrn  pSrn   u1:
Proof. See appendix.
Lemma 3 states the following: if a previously informed and an uninformed depositor
share the same belief, and the uninformed depositor is willing to wait, then the previously
informed depositor is also willing to wait. The intuition behind the lemma is the follow-
ing. Conditional on being impatient, a depositor prefers to withdraw immediately. If an
uninformed depositor is willing to wait, it must be true that conditional on being patient,
the expected utility from waiting is higher than that from withdrawing immediately.
Proposition 1 Given c1  1, the beliefs and strategies in (1)  (13) constitute a perfect
Bayesian equilibrium in the post-deposit game.
Proof. The proof process is divided into several steps to facilitate reading.
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Step 1: Check the beliefs.
By construction, beliefs are updated by the Bayesrule whenever possible.
Step 2: Check the strategies of an uninformed depositor with no detectable deviation.
By construction, the expected utility of an uninformed depositor at stage n is wUn
 
pUn

.
If it is lower than or equal to u1, he should withdraw. Otherwise, he should not.
Step 3: Check the strategies of a newly informed depositor with no detectable devia-
tion.
For a newly informed depositor at stage n, it must be true that wUn 1
 
pUn 1
  u1 at
the stage before. That is, pUn 1  p. If a herd of non-withdrawals has begun already, that
is, pUn = p
U
n 1  p; the newly informed depositors action does not change other depositors
beliefs, and he will not be able to infer any information in future. Even though he receives
a low signal, his private belief is still above p^, so he will be waiting. If a herd of non-
withdrawals has not begun yet, that is, p  pUn 1 < p; the uninformed depositorsbelief
will be updated by either PH or PeL. Let us discuss cases by the signal that the newly
informed gets at stage n.
(1) The newly informed depositor gets a high signal. His belief is pSn=Hn = PH
 
pUn 1
 
p^. If he waits, an uninformed depositors belief will also be pUn = PH
 
pUn 1

. By corollary
1, the uninformed depositors will be waiting too. If the newly informed depositor waits, he
will become a previously informed depositor and share the same belief with the uninformed
depositors. By lemma 3, he will wait.
(2) The newly informed depositor gets a low signal. His belief is now pSn=Ln =
PL
 
pUn 1

< p^. According to the strategies, he should withdraw and get u1. Sup-
pose he waits. Then the belief of an uninformed depositor is misled to be updated to
pUn = PH
 
pUn 1

. From then on, the belief of an uninformed depositor is always two
signals above that of the depositor informed at n; that is, pSn=Lm = P
2
L
 
pUm

for m  n.
By choosing to wait, the best outcome that the newly informed depositor can antici-
pate is a herd of non-withdrawals. (If he anticipates a herd of withdrawals to occur, he
should withdraw immediately.) Suppose a herd of non-withdrawals occurs at a later stage
m < N . The posterior of an uninformed depositor at stage m satises pUm  p. It also
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must be true that pUm 1 < p. Otherwise, the herd of non-withdrawals could have begun
earlier. As pUm 1 < p
U
m, we have p
U
m = PH
 
pUm 1

. Updating both sides by P 2L, we have
pSnm = P
2
L
 
pUm

= P 2LPH
 
pUm 1

= PL
 
pUm 1

< p^. Thus, at the stage that the herd of non-
withdrawals begins, the expected utility of the depositor informed at stage n is still lower
than u1. In the case when neither a herd of withdrawals nor a herd of non-withdrawals
occurs before stage N , it must be true that the uninformed depositorsbelief satises
pUN 1 < p, which implies the deviators belief at stage N is below p^. Therefore, the de-
positor informed at stage n does not benet from deviation. A newly informed depositor
weakly prefers to withdraw immediately if a low productivity signal is received.
Step 4: Check a previously informed depositors strategy with no detectable deviation.
If a previously informed depositor chose to wait before the herd of non-withdrawals
begins, he must have received a high signal. By choosing to wait, he has conveyed the
high signal to all other depositors. Thus, the previously informed depositors and the
uninformed depositors have the same belief. By lemma 3, a previously informed depositor
always waits if an uninformed depositor waits given the same belief. If a previously
informed depositor waits because a herd of non-withdrawals has begun before he got the
signal, then he will be waiting from then as no more updates on the belief are available
and his belief is above p^.
Step 5: Check the strategies of active depositors if there is a detectable deviation.
Because the consumption types are private information, the deviations are unde-
tectable to the uninformed depositors unless more than 1 withdrawals are observed at
a stage before a herd of withdrawals begins. The newly informed depositor detects devi-
ations at current stage, and he will withdraw if p^ > 0 because his belief is 0 now. In this
case, the uninformed depositorsbeliefs also falls to zero because at lease two withdrawals
at a stage are observed. Therefore, all depositors withdraw. If p^ = 0, no one will withdraw
even though deviations are detected as u1 = u2. Waiting is the dominant strategy in this
case even if all other depositors withdraw.
Another plausible detectable deviation is as follows: the newly informed depositor
should withdraw regardless of the signal. If he waits, the uninformed depositors detect
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the deviation. If this was the case, it must be true that at stage n, pUn 1 < p. However,
given such a belief at stage n  1, the uninformed depositors must have all withdrawn at
stage n  1 from the bank already.
3.1.4 Discussion of the Equilibrium - the High Cuto¤ ProbabilityCondi-
tion Holds
With the high cuto¤ probabilitycondition, the sequence of (~p0; ~p1; :::; ~pN 1; p^; p^) is the
threshold beliefs above which the uninformed depositors wait, below which they with-
draw. While (p^; p^; ::p^; p^; p^) is the sequence of the threshold beliefs above which the newly
informed depositors wait, below which they withdraw. A herd of non-withdrawals hap-
pens before stage n if pUn  p. At stages N and N + 1, if beliefs are above p^, depositors
will wait unless they are impatient. Therefore, for all depositors (p; p; :::; p; p^; p^) is the
sequence of beliefs above which a herd of non-withdrawals occurs at a stage.
Because ~pn is unique and is decreasing in n, we can calculate the number of updates
by PeL that are needed to trigger a bank run at stage n starting with p0. Let Zn solve
PZn 1~L (p0)  ~pn, and PZn~L (p0) < ~pn:
If there have Zn number of withdrawals up to stage n, a bank run will take place. Because
~pn  p^, a non-withdrawal will trigger a herd of non-withdrawals.
What we observe in the equilibrium is as follows: A newly informed depositor follows
his productivity signal if his prior at the stage is below p. If the newly informed depositors
keep lining up in front of the bank, the beliefs of the uninformed depositors will nally fall
below the cuto¤, and they will demand their deposits back. Before their beliefs drop below
the cuto¤, if one high signal can be conveyed by the non-withdrawal decision of a newly
informed depositor, they will be convinced to wait. In a situation that the uninformed
depositors observe consecutive withdrawals, but the number of withdrawals is not too
large, the uninformed depositors watch the line closely. Their beliefs will be updated by
the decisions of the newly informed depositors.
Let us try to understand why the cuto¤ probabilities are higher before stage N if the
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high cuto¤ probabilitycondition is satised. Given pUN in the interval of [PeL (p^) ; p^), a
bank run takes place at stage N . The social welfare, measured by the aggregate expected
utility, falls to 1
c1
u1. However, with the high cuto¤probabilitycondition, if depositors do
not withdraw, the social welfare would actually be higher than that in the bank run. From
the view of social welfare, bank run is undesirable. Nevertheless, it is to an individual
depositors own interest to withdraw early. To an individual depositor, due to the costly
liquidation, his expected utility also experiences a sudden drop when there presents a
possibility of bank runs. Aware of the possibility of having a bank run at next stage, the
depositors must be more optimistic to wait for more information at stage N   1. Hence,
the cuto¤ belief at stage N   1 is higher than p^. Working backwards, as the uncertainty
of having a bank run gradually resolves, the cuto¤ beliefs are decreasing as time goes by.
Depositors are becoming more and more willing to wait.
3.1.5 Discussion of the Equilibrium - the Low Cuto¤ProbabilityCondition
Holds
If the low cuto¤ probabilitycondition is satised, when depositors withdraw with the
belief of PeL (p^) at stage N , the aggregate expected utility is 1c1u1. While if they wait, the
expected utility in the last period will be lower. Bank runs that happen under such a
circumstance is not undesirable as they mitigate future losses. As bank runs serve as a
valuable option, the uninformed depositors with the belief that is slightly lower than p^
are still willing to wait at next stage N   1, even though they are aware of the positive
probability of bank runs. The expected utility at stage N   1 given the posterior of p^ is
thus raised above u1. By backward induction, the cuto¤ probabilities are lower than p^ for
any stage before N:
Two possible and interesting results associated with the low cuto¤ probabilitycon-
dition are (1) non-monotonicity of the expected utility in belief, and (2) non-uniqueness
of the cuto¤ probabilities.
Non-monotonicity of the expected utility in belief:
As early liquidation can help mitigate future losses, the economy in which information
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has a chance to be revealed can do better than the economy without information. From
gure 2, we can see that wUn (p) is above u1 + (1  ) [pu2 + (1  p)u2], which is the
expected utility in an economy with no information about production, for some p.
Because information about production is valuable, and a herd of non-withdrawals
suppresses the inference of private information, a higher belief does not necessarily result
in a higher expected utility. There are two opposite forces behind the expected utility: A
higher belief brings more condence in production. However, an economy with a higher
belief also reaches a herd of non-withdrawals faster, where no information will be available
since then. Whether the expected utility increases in belief depends on the strength of
the two forces7.
The non-monotonicity of the expected utility function in herding has not been paid
attention in the literature. In the literature, herding is usually treated as a partial equi-
librium problem, in which the cuto¤s are determined by the assumption of parameters.
An agents 0-1 decision either perfectly reveals the signal received, or both decisions carry
the same amount of noises. Given an initial prior, only a few crucial probability levels (1
and 2 signals above and below the initial prior) are needed to prove the equilibrium. In
the banking set-up with one-side signal extraction problem, the belief updated by observ-
ing a non-withdrawal is not completely o¤set by a withdrawal. The number of possible
posteriors is increasing geometrically in each stage. Therefore, a general description of
the expected utility function on the full domain of beliefs becomes necessary. Also, the
cuto¤ probabilities vary with the contract. In order to calculate the optimal contract, the
value of the expected utility given any parameters (in particular, c1 and ) needs to be
determined.
Then why the expected utility function is always increasing in beliefs when the high
cuto¤ probability condition holds? Note that the back-up option here is a bank run.
Unlike a safe asset in an investment herding problem, a bank run is costly as some
depositors are not paid. If the welfare cost is too high, a bank run is no longer a safety
net. The high cuto¤ probabilitycondition is a su¢ cient condition for a bank run to
7The monotonicity is guaranteed for wUN and w
U
N 1:
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be too costly. The uncertainty of having a bank run lowers the expected utility. A higher
belief not only stands for a higher expected return, but it also means a lower probability
of having a costly bank run. Because an earlier stage faces more future history paths,
and the paths are gradually ruled out throughout period 1, the uncertainty is smaller at
a later stage than at an earlier stage. The cuto¤ belief is thus decreasing in n.
Note that the high/low cuto¤ probability condition only compares the expected
utility at stage N given the belief of P~L (p^) if there is no run with the expected utility
in a bank run. It is a condition that relies on backward induction to decide whether the
cuto¤ probabilities at stages before N are higher or lower than p^. It is not the necessary
and su¢ cient condition for the monotonicity of the expected utility function.
Non-uniqueness of the cuto¤ probabilities:
As the monotonicity of expected utility is not guaranteed, our next question is whether
the cuto¤ probability ~pn is unique. In fact, the uniqueness of the cuto¤ probabilities is
no longer assured8. Figure 3 shows an example.
Example 3: An example of non-uniqueness of the cuto¤ probabilities:
u (c) = (c+b)
1  b1 
1  ; b = 0:01;  = 1:5: R = 2:07; R = 0; p0 = 0:9: q = 0:7:  = 0:25.
Let c1 = 1:011; and  = c1 = 0:2528: u2 = 18:6107; u2 = 0; u1 = 18:0207: p^ = 0:9683:
p = 0:9862:
0.945 0.95 0.955 0.96 0.965 0.97 0.975 0.98 0.985 0.99 0.995
17.6
17.7
17.8
17.9
18
18.1
18.2
18.3
18.4
18.5
pN-6
w N
-6
Figure 3: An Example of Non-uniqueness of the Cuto¤ Probabilities
8It is guaranteed for wUN ; w
U
N 1; and w
U
N 2:
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Figure 3 shows the expected utility of an uninformed depositor at the stage of N   6.
There are two cuto¤s at stage N   6, 0:9546 and 0:9562. If the posterior at stage N   6
falls below (including) 0:9546 or between (including) 0:9551 and (excluding) 0:9562, the
uninformed depositors will run on the bank.
Non-uniqueness of the cuto¤ beliefs results from payment inter-dependence. In an
investment herding problem with no payment dependence, an investors expected utility
is always higher than the return on safe asset as the safe asset is always available and
its value is constant. Therefore, the cuto¤ belief is the lowest level of belief given which
information is still able to be revealed. It is always unique. Here in the banking setup, the
value of the option to withdraw decreases when all depositors exercise it. An individual
depositor compares his expected utility with u1, while his expected utility in a bank run
is actually 1
c
u1. The cuto¤ level of his expected utility is higher than the realized value
of his option to withdraw. When the expected utility is low, an individual depositor
prefers to use his option to withdraw before all others do so (although all others do the
same things) rathan than wait for more information. As the expected utility does not
necessarily increase in belief, there can be more than one cuto¤ beliefs. A bank run can
happen given a relatively higher belief instead of a lower one.
Non-uniqueness of the cuto¤ beliefs implies the following: Given the same contract,
an economy that starts with higher initial prior p0 can be more vulnerable to bank runs
than the one with lower initial prior. A bank run may be triggered by fewer withdrawals
in the economy with a higher level of belief than with a lower level of belief. This is
because an economy with higher initial prior has higher probability to reach a herd of
non-withdrawals, thus has less chance to reveal information. In example 3, uninformed
depositors with belief of pUN 7 = 0:9727 (P~L (0:9727) = 0:9562) run on the bank if a
withdrawal is observed at stageN 6. While if their belief is pUN 7 = 0:9717 (P~L (0:9717) =
0:9547), they prefer to wait.
A question associated with the non-uniqueness is whether it is possible that a shorter
queue can encourage a bank run more than a longer queue given the same parameters
but di¤erent sequences of signals. To formalize the question, suppose wUn (p
1)  u1, while
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wUn (p
2) < u1, and p  p1 < p2 < p^: Is it possible that p1 results from more observed
withdrawals than p2? The answer is no. Suppose the economy observes m withdrawals
up to stage n to reach p1; while it takes m   1 withdrawals up to stage n to reach p2.
We have p1 = PLPeL (p2). As p2 < p^, p1 < PL (p^) = p: It contradicts the assumption
that p1 is above p: Therefore, in the equilibrium, a longer queue always implies that low
productivity is more likely, and it encourages people to run on the bank.
Without the uniqueness of the cuto¤s, it is di¢ cult to describe generally the sequences
that can trigger a bank run. Two non-withdrawals in a row will denitely trigger a herd of
non-withdrawals. As a decision of withdrawal conveys noisy information about the signal
received, it does not o¤set a decision of non-withdrawal completely. Hence, sequences
such as (0; 1; 0) ; (0; 1; 1; 0) ; (0; 1; 1; 0; 1; 0) also can lead to a herd of non-withdrawals,
depending on the parameters of the economy.
In summary, the following will be observed in the equilibrium: A newly informed
depositor follows his productivity signals until his belief is above p. If many informed
depositors do not withdraw, the beliefs of the uninformed depositors will be raised above
p, and a herd of non-withdrawals will start. In the opposite case, if many people withdraw,
all other depositors will demand their deposits back. In a situation that the uninformed
depositors observe neither too many withdrawals nor too many non-withdrawals, they
will watch the line closely. Their beliefs will be updated by the decisions of the newly
informed depositor.
The equilibrium proved in proposition 1 is not unique. For example, there can be
equilibria in which at the rst few stages, the newly informed depositors adopt the strate-
gies described in proposition 1. But from stage m (1 < m  N) on, the newly informed
depositors always wait for the last stage to make their decisions. Because wUn
 
pUn

changes
with the strategies adopted, it is di¢ cult to exhaust all possible equilibria. However, as
the purpose of this paper is to illustrate how people make withdrawal decisions based on
the observed withdrawals by others, I assume that depositors only play the equilibrium
strategies in proposition 1 in the post-deposit game.
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3.2 Equilibrium Given c1 < 1
When c1 < 1, there does not exist a symmetric pure strategy run equilibrium at any
stage, because given all others withdraw from the bank, an individual depositor prefers
to wait to get all the remaining resources, which is expected to be an innite amount.
Not withdrawing before stage N + 1 is a patient depositors weakly dominant strategy
regardless of all other depositorsactions and signals. Therefore, given c1 < 1, I assume
all patient depositors always wait until stage N + 1 to make decisions according to their
belief and consumption type. Because no information can be inferred from the decisions
of the newly informed depositors, and because the measure of depositors who are informed
before the last stage is 0, bank run does not occur.
There exist multiple symmetric pure strategy no-run equilibria given c1 < 1. In order
to allow for a symmetric pure strategy no-run equilibrium given any possible sequence of
signals, the uninformed depositorsbelief should be always above p^ at any stage.
Let Z solve
PZ~L (p0)  p^; PZ+1~L (p0) < p^:
A symmetric pure strategy no-run equilibrium requires that no more than Z newly in-
formed depositors follow their signals at the rst Z stages. The rest of the depositors will
delay their withdrawals until stage N + 1. If P~L (p0) < p^, all informed depositors will be
waiting until stage N + 1 unless they are impatient.
Construct the expected utility of an uninformed depositor in a no-run equilibrium
at each stage by backward induction in the similar way of constructing (2)   (3) : We
will nd that wUn (p0) = w
U
N (p0) for any n. In terms of social welfare, the equilibrium
is equivalent to the one in the economy without information about production. This is
because information is never revealed to the valuable point in this equilibrium. The ex-
ante welfare is the same in all of the symmetric pure strategy equilibria given the same
contract.
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4 Pre-deposit Game
Once the equilibrium in the post-deposit game is proved, the probability of having a bank
run given a contract is determined. Questions remain are (1) Knowing the probability
of bank runs in any possible situation, what is the optimal contract that a competitive
bank will provide? (2) Is the optimal contract individually rational (is it better than
autarky and accepted by the depositors ex ante)? Peck and Shell (2003) show that the
ex-ante acceptable optimal contract can tolerate panic-based bank runs if the probability
of runs is small enough, and that bank runs are equilibrium phenomena. In this section,
I will follow their logic to illustrate that the optimal demand-deposit contract can permit
herding runs.
In the static bank-runs model, a feasible contract should at least satisfy the participa-
tion incentive compatibility constraint, which says given all other patient depositors do
not withdraw the deposits, an individual patient depositor prefers to wait. In the dynamic
setup, a bank run can happen at any stage, but a feasible contract should at least give
depositors the incentive to wait before anyone gets a signal. The participation incentive
compatibility constraint is
wU0 (p0)  u1. (14)
The participation incentive compatibility constraint in the traditional Diamond-Dybvig
model is a special case here with N = 0 and p = 1.
The bank chooses a contract to o¤er. There are two types of contracts available to the
bank: run-proof contracts and run-admitting contracts. A run-proof contract guarantees
that whichever signals are sent in the post-deposit game, the expected utility of the
uninformed depositors never fall below the threshold at any stage.
4.1 Run-Proof Contracts
A run-proof contract is in one of the three cases in my model:
Case 1: A contract that provides c1 < 1.
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Case 2: c1  1; and
PL (p0)u2 + (1  PL (p0))u2  u1: (15)
That is, the initial belief is already above p. A herd of non-withdrawals has already begun
before anyone gets signals. The uninformed depositors never update their beliefs by the
observed actions. If (17) is satised, we have pUn = p0 > ep0 > epn for any n.
Case 3: c1  1, and
PL (p0)u2 + (1  PL (p0))u2 < u1; (16)
wUn
 
P neL (p0)  u180  n  N: (17)
That is, the newly informed depositors withdraw if low signals are received. However,
because there are too few stages and/or because the probability of being impatient is
relatively high, the beliefs of the uninformed depositors are still above the thresholds
even though the beliefs are updated by PeL () at every stage. Note that if (17) holds,
wn (pn) = u1+(1  ) [pnu2 + (1  pn)u2] for any 0  n  N +1 and for any pn derived
from p0. Therefore, (17) can be re-written as
PNeL (p0)  p^: (170)
Given a run-proof contract, w0 (p0) = u1 + (1  ) [p0u2 + (1  p0)u2]. The best
run-proof contract solves
maxc1;w0 (p0) = u1 + (1  ) [p0u2 + (1  p0)u2]
s:t: c1 < 1; or
c1  1 and (14)  (15) ; or
c1  1, (14) ; and (16)  (17) :
4.2 Run-Admitting Contracts (N = 2)
A run-admitting contract admits a herd of withdrawals because wUn
 
pUn

< u1 at at least
one stage for some realization of pUn derived from p0. The ex-ante probability of having
a bank run given a contract can be calculated by checking how likely wUn
 
pUn

will be
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lower than u1 at each stage. With the high cuto¤ probabilitycondition, the probability
of bank runs given a contract is determined by the probability of getting Zn number of
withdrawals in a row up to stage n. Zn is determined by the cuto¤ probabilities, and the
cuto¤s are functions of c1 and . If the high cuto¤ probabilitycondition does not hold,
it is di¢ cult to write out the general rules of calculating the probability of bank runs.
The stage of which a herd of withdrawals occurs depends not only on the parameters, but
also on the random process in which the signals are sent.
In this section, a pre-deposit game of N = 2 is calculated. A more general case can be
calculated in the same way. There are ve cases for a run-admitting contract for N = 2,
depending on the conditions with which a herd of withdrawals starts. The conditions for
each case and the objective function of wU0 (p0) of each case are listed in the appendix.
Case I: A herd of non-withdrawals begins if the rst informed depositor waits. If the rst
informed depositor withdraws and the second also withdraws, then a bank run occurs. If
the rst withdraws and the second waits, the uninformed depositors wait. The probability
of bank runs is
1 = (1   (p0))
 
1    PeL (p0) .
Case II: A herd of non-withdrawals does not occur if the rst informed depositor waits.
The second depositor still follows his signals, but the uninformed depositors do not with-
draw regardless of the second depositors decision. A herd of withdrawals does not occur
after the rst depositor withdraws. If both the rst and the second informed depositors
withdraw, then a bank run occurs. The probability of bank runs is 1.
Case III: A herd of withdrawals begins if the rst informed depositor withdraws. If the
rst informed depositor waits, a herd of non-withdrawals begins. The probability of bank
runs is
2 = 1   (p0) :
Case IV: A herd of withdrawals starts if the rst informed depositor withdraws. If the
rst informed depositor waits, the second depositor still follows his signal. However, the
uninformed depositors do not withdraw regardless of the second depositors decision. The
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probability of bank runs is 2.
Case V: A herd of withdrawals starts if the rst informed depositor withdraws. If the rst
informed depositor waits, the second depositor still follows the signal. The uninformed
depositors wait if the second depositor waits, and they withdraw if the second depositor
withdraws. The probability of bank runs is
3 = 1   (p0) +  (p0) (1   (PH (p0))) :
A competitive bank chooses the optimal contract from the classes of run-proof and
run-admitting contracts. A run-proof contract is usually associated with lower c1. The
bank keeps more asset in storage so that the di¤erence between payments in di¤erent
periods and in di¤erent production state is small. A run-admitting contract usually
provides higher c1. Although c2 in a run-admitting contract varies more between di¤erent
production states, when the probability of low productivity is small, investing more in
production is more desirable. There are three factors concerning which type of contract
to o¤er. First, because a run-admitting contract usually provides more liquidity to early
withdrawals, and the bank invests more in production though it is risky, the contract helps
smooth consumptions and allows for higher return in the last period when production
is high. This is a positive side of providing a run-admitting contract. Second, a run
admitting contract allows depositors to reveal their private information by their decisions.
A herding run is partly fundamental driven. It is not necessarily undesirable in an economy
with weak fundamentals as it mitigates future losses. It is again a positive side of a
run-admitting contract. Thirdly, as the signals and the information extracted from a
depositors action are not perfect, a bank run can happen when fundamentals are strong.
This is a negative side of a run-admitting contract. Which contract to provide depends
on the overall e¤ects of the three.
The choice among run-admitting contracts also depends on several factors. First, a
higher c1 helps smooth consumptions across types, but it is usually associated with higher
probability of bank runs and lower social welfare in bank runs. The second factor is unique
to a sequential-move game. The optimal run-admitting contract should allow as much
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information as possible to be sensed publicly before any type of herd begins. The rst N
depositors can be treated as experiments. The result of each experiment can only be read
before herds begin. A careful choice of contract should prolong the e¤ective experiment
process as much as possible. High c1 and low c2s can encourage people to run on the
bank, and a bank run can happen too soon.
I compute two examples to illustrate that in some economies a run-admitting contract
is optimal, while in other economies a run-proof contract is optimal. I compute the best
contract in each of the three run-proof cases and the ve run-admitting cases. The optimal
contract is the best of the best.
In the economy without signals about production, the bank chooses c1 and  to max-
imize u1 + (1  ) [p0u2 + (1  p0)u2], subject to the incentive compatibility constraint
p0u2 + (1  p0)u2  u1. If even given the optimal demand deposit contract herding runs
are undesirable, the bank may want to use a curtainto prevent depositors from seeing
each othersactions. From the examples below, we will see that information can improve
ex-ante welfare.
An individual depositors expected utility in autarky is u (1). If the optimal banking
contract is accepted ex-ante, wU0 (p0) must be at least equal to u (1).
4.3 Computed Examples
Parameters and functions used in examples 4 and 5 are u (c) = (c+b)
1  b1 
1  ; b = 0:001;
 = 1:01: R = 1:5; R = 0:2; p0 = 0:99: q = 0:99:
Example 4:  = 0:01.
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Table 1: Optimal Contract - Example 4
 c1  w0 (p0)
Autarky 0 1:0000 1 7:1529
Banking economy without info 0 1:0001 0:0100 7:5332
Best run-proof contract in case 1 0 1:0000 0:0100 7:5332
Best run-proof contract in case 2 0 1:0000 1:0000 7:1529
Best run-proof contract in case 3 0 1:0000 1:0000 7:1529
Best run-admitting contract in case I 0:0102 1:0000 0:0100 7:5487
Best run-admitting contract in case II 0:0102 1:0000 1:0000 7:1529
Best run-admitting contract in case III 0:0296 1:0876 0:0109 7:5263
Best run-admitting contract in case IV 0:0296 1:0000 1:0000 7:1529
Best run-admitting contract in case V 0:0490 1:4868 0:0149 7:4310
Note that the best run-proof contract in case 1 provides c1 less than, but very close
to 1. A run-proof contract is not the best in this example mainly because it does not
induce depositors to reveal the signals they received. The economy cannot benet from
the available information about productivity. This is also the reason why the economy
with information about production can achieve higher ex-ante welfare than the economy
without information.
Example 5:  = 0:2.
Table 2: Optimal Contract - Example 5
 c1  w0 (p0)
Autarky 0 1 1 7:1529
Banking economy without info 0 1:0028 0:2006 7:4602
Best run-proof contract in case 1 0 1:0000 0:2000 7:4602
Best run-proof contract in case 2 0 1:0000 1:0000 7:1529
Best run-proof contract in case 3 0 1:0028 0:2006 7:4602
Best run-admitting contract in case I 0:0527 1:0213 0:2043 7:4523
Best run-admitting contract in case II 0:0527 1:0000 1:0000 7:1529
Best run-admitting contract in case III 0:2158 1:1047 0:2209 7:2785
Best run-admitting contract in case IV 0:2158 1:0000 1:0000 7:1529
Best run-admitting contract in case V 0:3790 1:0000 1:0000 7:1529
In this example, a run-proof contract is optimal. The increase in  adds more noise to
the informed depositorswithdrawal decisions. If it is a run-admitting contract, the prob-
ability of bank runs is increased because the probability of observing informed depositors
withdraw is raised. In addition, as there are more impatient depositors in the economy,
the payments to the depositors in period 1 are decreased due to the resource constraint,
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which leaves more room for using a run-proof contract. In this example, a run-admitting
contract is not desirable as bank runs happen too frequently when the fundamentals are
strong.
Green and Lin (2003 (a, b)) provide a model in which depositors make decisions
whether to withdraw in sequence, although the depositors do not observe the line nor
the decisions by others. They show that there exists an optimal banking contract which
completely eliminates panic-based bank runs. My paper discusses bank runs given a
demand-deposit contract. It does not seek a banking mechanism that eliminates herding
runs. A demand-deposit contract with sequential service is widely used in the banking
industry9. It is worthwhile as the rst attempt to explain the queuing process given
a contract in a narrow class of banking mechanism such as a simple demand-deposit
contract.
A crucial di¤erence between Green and Lins economy and my economy is that there
is no production uncertainty in Green and Lins economy. Green and Lins mechanism
induces the depositors to tell their private information their consumption type truth-
fully by their decisions. While in this model there are two dimensions of uncertainty.
The 0-1 withdrawal decision cannot fully reveal the private information that a depositor
has. Thus, there exists information asymmetry between the bank and depositors. Even if
the bank is allowed to provide a contract that o¤ers payments contingent on withdrawal
history, it may not be able to eliminate bank runs. In a di¤erent paper, I show that in a
two-depositor, two-stage economy with partial suspension of convertibility in the sense of
Wallace (1988, 1990), a run-admitting contract can be optimal. However, those are still
open questions whether a run-admitting contract can be optimal in a multi-depositor,
multi-stage economy with partial suspension of convertibility, and whether there exists
an optimal banking mechanism that eliminates both panic-runs and fundamental-runs.
9Calomiris and Kahn (1991) show that demand-deposit contract is e¢ cient if a banks moral hazard
problem potentially exists. Since bank runs are costly, depositors are motivated to monitor the bank and
the moral hazard problem will be reduced.
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5 Conclusion
This paper provides a model for studying detailed dynamics in bank runs. In an economy
with uncertainty in production, a line in front of a bank carries information about the
production status. The formation of a line outside a bank can persuade others to join the
line. In my model, a depositor makes withdrawal decision according to his observation
of the withdrawal histories of the others as well as his private information about the
bank fundamentals. Given a simple demand-deposit contract, there is a perfect Bayesian
equilibrium in which depositors withdraw deposits too many withdrawals are observed,
and wait otherwise. In some economies, the simple demand-deposit contract allowing for
herding runs is optimal because it achieves higher risk-sharing among depositors and/or
allows private information about production to be revealed.
There is some literature on bank runs that is closely related to this paper. Gold-
stein and Pauzner (2005) construct a model in which depositors receive i.i.d signals on
fundamentals and determine whether to run on the bank simultaneously. Chens (1999)
explains contagious bank runs using information externality. Chari and Jagannathan
(1988) analyze an economy with random productivity. Some depositors are informed of
the productivity status and others are not. The uninformed depositors infer informa-
tion on productivity by observing the aggregate withdrawals rate. There is a rational
expectation equilibrium in the model which allows for bank runs. However, Chari and
Jagannathan adopt a static equilibrium concept. The bank in their model does not have
intrinsic role in the economy. The cost of bank runs is imposed exogenously. Long-run
payments do not depend on whether bank runs occur in the short run. My paper addresses
these problems, and emphasizes the welfare aspect of herding runs.
In the present paper, the bank has no information advantage over the majority, which
is not quite true in reality. In a more complicated model in which the bank receives signals
about productivity, there arise problems such as how to eliminate banks moral hazard
problem due to the information asymmetry between the bank and the depositors, and
how the bank reduces the probability of bank runs due to the misleading signals. This
can be the extensions to the paper.
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Allowing payments to vary with the evolution of history will gives the bank more
exibility and will achieve higher social welfare (Wallace (1988, 1990)). Is there a more
general banking mechanism, for example, a mechanism induces people to report truthfully
about the signals, achieving a more e¢ cient allocation? An e¢ cient banking mechanism
should not only allow the bank to provide a contract depending on the withdrawal history,
but also eliminate asymmetric information between the bank and the depositors as much
as possible. To nd a more e¢ cient mechanism in the economy with uncertainties in
both production and consumption is another extension of this paper, and more policy
implications can be derived from the nding of such a mechanism.
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6 Appendix
6.1 Proofs of Lemmas 1- 3 and Collarary 1
Lemma 1 Consider a contract that pays c1  1 and satises the high cuto¤probability
condition. For each stage 0  n  N; wUn (p) is increasing in p: There exists a unique
cuto¤probability ~pn such that wUn (p)  u1 for p 2 [~pn; 1]; and wUn (p) = 1c1u1 for p 2 [0; ~pn):
~pn is decreasing in n. wUn (p)  u1 + (1  ) [pu2 + (1  p)u2] for p 2 [~pn; 1]:
Proof. If p^  0; we have u1  u2, and pu2 + (1  p)u2  u1 for any p 2 [0; 1] : Hence,
wUn (pn) = u1 + (1  ) [pnu2 + (1  pn)u2]  u1 for pn 2 [0; 1]. ~pn = 0 for all n:
Same argument applies to p^  1: wUn (p) = 1c1u1 on pn 2 [0; 1]: ~pn = 1 for all n:
Let us discuss the case when p^ 2 (0; 1) :
wUN (p) is increasing in p by its denition. It has a unique cuto¤ probability is p^.
For N   1; wUN 1 (p) = u1 + (1  ) [pu2 + (1  p)u2] for p  p by denition. Check
 (p)wUN (PH (p)) + (1   (p))wUN
 
PeL (p) for p < p.
Because wUN (p) is increasing in p,  (p)w
U
N (PH (p)) + (1    (p))wUN
 
PeL (p) is also
increasing in p for p < p. limp!p  (p)wUN (PH (p)) + (1    (p))wUN
 
PeL (p) = u1 +
(1  ) [pu2 + (1  p)u2] : Hence wUN 1 (p) is increasing on [0; 1], and a unique cuto¤prob-
ability ~pN 1 can be found.
Let P ~H (p) be the inverse function of P~L (p). w
U
N 1 (p) = u1+(1  ) [pu2 + (1  p)u2]
for p  P ~H (p^).
If
 (P ~H (p^)) fu1 + (1  ) [PH (P ~H (p^))u2 + (1  PH (P ~H (p^)))u2]g+
+(1   (P ~H (p^))) 1c1u1
< u1;
then p^ < ~pN 1 = P ~H (p^) < p. w
U
N 1 (p) = u1 + (1  ) [pu2 + (1  p)u2]  u1 for p 
~pN 1:
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If the inequality does not hold, a unique cuto¤ ~pN 1 < P ~H (p^) can be found to solve
 (~pN 1) fu1 + (1  ) [PH (~pN 1)u2 + (1  PH (~pN 1))u2]g+
+(1   (~pN 1)) 1c1u1
= u1;
by the continuity and the monotonicity of the above function in p. By high cuto¤
probability condition, p^ < ~pN 1 < P ~H (p^) < p. Also by the high cuto¤ probability
condition, wUN 1 (P~L (p)) =
1
c1
u1 < u1 + (1  )

PeL (p)u2 +  1  PeL (p)u2 for p 2
[~pN 1; P ~H(p^)): Therefore, w
U
N 1 (p)  u1 + (1  ) [pu2 + (1  p)u2] on [~pN 1; 1]:
Prove the rest by induction.
Suppose it is true for every stage up to stage n + 1 that (1) wUn+1 (p) is increasing
in p. (2) p^ < ~pn+2  ~pn+1  p: If wUn+1 (~pn+1) > u1; ~pn+1 = min
n
P
N (n+1)
~H
(p^) ; p
o
;
wUn+1 (p) = u1 + (1  ) [pu2 + (1  p)u2] for p  ~pn+1. If wUn+1 (~pn+1) = u1; ~pn+1 <
min
n
P
N (n+1)
~H
(p^) ; p
o
: wUn+2 (P~L (~pn+1)) =
1
c1
u1; (3)wUn+1 (p)  u1+(1  ) [pu2 + (1  p)u2]
for p 2 [~pn+1; 1]:
Check the properties of wUn (p):
(i) monotonicity.
wUn (p) = u1 + (1  ) [pu2 + (1  p)u2] for p  p. For p < p; as wUn+1 (p) is in-
creasing in p,  (p)wUn+1 (PH (p)) + (1    (p))wUn+1
 
PeL (p) is also increasing. Check
 (p)wUn+1 (PH (p)) + (1   (p))wUn+1
 
PeL (p).
If PeL (p)  ~pn+1;
u1  wUn+1
 
PeL (p)  u1 + (1  ) PeL (p)u2 +  1  PeL (p)u2 :
If PeL (p) < ~pn+1;
wUn+1
 
PeL (p) = 1c1u1 < u1 + (1  ) PeL (p)u2 +  1  PeL (p)u2 :
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Therefore,
 (p)wUn+1 (PH (p)) + (1   (p))wUn+1
 
PeL (p)  u1 + (1  ) [pu2 + (1  p)u2] :
Hence, wUn (p) is increasing on [0; 1], and there is a unique cuto¤ probability ~pn:
(ii) p^ < ~pn+1  ~pn  p:
Plug ~pn+1 into  (p)wUn+1 (PH (p)) + (1   (p))wUn+1
 
PeL (p) ; we have
 (~pn+1)w
U
n+1 (PH (~pn+1)) + (1   (~pn+1))wUn+1
 
PeL (~pn+1)
=  (~pn+1) fu1 + (1  ) [PH (~pn+1)u2 + (1  PH (~pn+1))u2]g+
(1   (~pn+1)) 1c1u1:
(a) If wUn+1 (~pn+1) = u1; w
U
n (~pn+1) = u1 because ~pn+1 solves the same problem. Hence,
we have ~pn = ~pn+1 < min
n
P
N (n+1)
~H
(p^) ; p
o
 min
n
PN n~H (p^) ; p
o
; wUn+1 (P~L (~pn)) =
wUn+2 (P~L (~pn+1)) =
1
c1
u1:
(b) If wUn+1 (~pn+1) > u1; ~pn+1 = min
n
P
N (n+1)
~H
(p^) ; p
o
. However, it must be true that
 (~pn+1) fu1 + (1  ) [PH (~pn+1)u2 + (1  PH (~pn+1))u2]g+
(1   (~pn+1)) 1c1u1  u1:
If not, we could have found a cuto¤ that is less than ~pn+1 for stage n + 1. Therefore,
wUn (~pn+1)  u1, and ~pn  ~pn+1 by the monotonicity of wUn+1 (p) :
Discuss ~pn in case (b). At pn = min
n
PN n~H (p^) ; p
o
; wUn (pn) = u1+(1  ) [pnu2 + (1  pn)u2] >
u1. Check
 (pn) fu1 + (1  ) [PH (pn)u2 + (1  PH (pn))u2]g+ (1   (pn)) 1c1u1:
If it is greater than u1, we can nd a cuto¤ of ~pn between

~pn+1;min
n
PN n~H (p^) ; p
o
to
satisfy wUn (~pn) = u1: If it is less than or equal to u1, ~pn = min
n
PN n~H (p^) ; p
o
:
(iii) wUn (p)  u1 + (1  ) [pu2 + (1  p)u2] for p 2 [~pn; 1]:
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wUn (p) = u1 + (1  ) [pu2 + (1  p)u2] for p 2 [p; 1]: For p 2 [~pn; p);
wUn (p) =  (p)w
U
n+1 (PH (p)) + (1   (~pn))wUn+1
 
PeL (p)
=  (p) fv1 + (1  ) [PH (p)u2 + (1  PH (p))u2]g+
+(1   (pn))wUn+1
 
PeL (p)
  (p) fu1 + (1  ) [PH (p)u2 + (1  PH (p))u2]g+
+(1   (pn))

u1 + (1  )

PeL (p)u2 +  1  PeL (p)u2	
= u1 + (1  ) [pu2 + (1  p)u2] :
Lemma 2 Consider a contract that satises low cuto¤probabilitycondition. wUn (p) 
u1 on [p^; 1] :
Proof. wUn (p) is increasing on [p; 1] by denition. w
U
n (p) > u1 on [p; 1]. For p 2 [p^; p);
we have PH (p)  p. Check  (p)wUn+1 (PH (p)) + (1   (~pn))wUn+1
 
PeL (p) :
(I) If wUn+1
 
PeL (p)  u1,
 (p)wUn+1 (PH (p)) + (1   (p))wUn+1
 
PeL (p) > u1:
(II) If wUn+1
 
PeL (p) = 1c1u1;
 (p)wUn+1 (PH (p)) + (1   (p))wUn+1
 
PeL (p)
=  (p) fu1 + (1  ) [PH (p)u2 + (1  PH (p))u2]g+
+(1   (p)) 1
c1
u1
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is strictly increasing in p in this case. Because
 (p^) fu1 + (1  ) [pu2 + (1  p)u2]g+ (1   (p^)) 1c1u1
  (p^) fu1 + (1  ) [pu2 + (1  p)u2]g+ (1   (p^)) fu1 + (1  ) [P~L (p^)u2 + (1  P~L (p^))u2]g
= u1 + (1  ) [p^u2 + (1  p^)u2]
 u1
by the low cuto¤probabilitycondition,  (p)wUn+1 (PH (p))+(1  (~pn))wUn+1
 
PeL (p) 
u1 for p 2 [p^; p): In both cases, wUn (p)  u1 on p 2 [p^; 1]:
Collarary 1 Consider a contract that pays c1  1. Given a posterior of p at stage n; if
wUn (p)  u1; then wUn+1 (PH (p))  u1:
Proof. It is obvious that Collarary 1 is true if the high cuto¤ probability conditionis
satised. If the low cuto¤ probability conditionholds, p must be greater than or equal
to p as wUn (p)  u1:
If p 2 [p^; 1], PH (p)  p:
wUn (PH (p)) = u1 + (1  ) [PH (p)u2 + (1  PH (p))u2]  u1:
If p 2 [p; p^); p^  PH (p) < p. By lemma 2, wUn (PH (p))  u1:
Lemma 3 If wUn (p)  u1; then wSrn (p)  u1:
Proof. Prove by induction. Show that at each stage, if wUn (p)  u1, wUn (p) can be
written as
wUn (p) = 

n (p)u1 + (1  n (p)) 1c1u1

+ (1  )wSrn (p) ;
where n (p) 2 [0; 1], and wSrn (p)  u1:
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Begin with stage N; if wUN (p)  u1;
wUN (p) = u1 + (1  ) [pu2 + (1  p)u2]
= u1 + (1  )wSrN (p)
 u1; so
wSrN (p) = pu2 + (1  p)u2  u1; and
N = 1:
Suppose it is true for every stage up to stage n+ 1. If wUn+1 (p)  u1; we have
wUn+1 (p) = 

n+1 (p)u1 + (1  n+1 (p)) 1c1u1

+ (1  )wSrn+1 (p) ;
where n+1 (p) 2 [0; 1], and wSrn+1 (p)  u1:
At stage n; suppose wUn (p)  u1:
If p  p, wUn (p) = u1 + (1  ) [pu2 + (1  p)u2]  u1. wSrn (p) = pu2 + (1  p)u2 
u1. n = 1:
If p < p, wUn (p) =  (p)w
U
n+1 (PH (p)) + (1    (p))wUn+1
 
PeL (p)  u1. By corollary
1, wUn+1 (PH (p))  u1. Suppose wUn+1
 
PeL (p)  u1. By the assumption at stage n, we
have wSrn+1 (PH (p))  u1 and wSrn+1
 
PeL (p)  u1. So wSrn (p) =  (p)wSrn+1 (PH (p)) + (1 
 (p))wSrn+1
 
PeL (p)  u1.
wUn (p) =  (p)w
U
n+1 (PH (p)) + (1   (p))wUn+1
 
PeL (p)
=  (p)



n+1 (PH (p))u1 + (1  n+1 (PH (p))) 1c1u1

+ (1  )wSrn+1 (PH (p))
	
+
+(1   (p)) n+1 (P~L (p))u1 + (1  n+1 (P~L (p))) 1c1u1+ (1  )wSrn+1 (P~L (p))	
= 

n (p)u1 + (1  n (p)) 1c1u1

+ (1  )wSrn+1 (p)
and n =  (p) n+1 (PH (p)) + (1   (p))n+1 (P~L (p)) :
Suppose wUn+1
 
PeL (p) < u1, so
wUn+1
 
PeL (p) = 1c1u1;
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and wSrn+1
 
PeL (p) = 1c1u1 by denition.
wUn (p) =  (p)w
U
n+1 (PH (p)) + (1   (p))wUn+1
 
PeL (p)
=  (p)wUn+1 (PH (p)) + (1   (p)) 1c1u1
=  (p)
8<: 

n+1 (pH (p))u1 + (1  n+1 (pH (p))) 1c1u1

+
(1  )wSrn+1 (PH (p))
9=;+ (1   (p)) 1c1u1
= 

n (p)u1 + (1  n (p)) 1c1u1

+
+(1  )  (p)wSrn+1 (PH (p)) + (1   (p))wSrn+1  PeL (p)
 u1; where n (p) =  (p) n+1 (PH (p)) so
wSrn (p) =  (p)w
Sr
n+1 (PH (p)) + (1   (p))wSrn+1
 
PeL (p)
 u1:
6.2 Conditions and Objective Functions of Run-Admitting Con-
tracts (N = 2)
A run-admitting contract should at least satisfy (14) and the following:
P 2eL (p0)u2 +  1  P 2eL (p0)u2  u1; (18)
P 2H (p0)u2 +
 
1  P 2H (p0)

u2 > u1; (19)
(18) and (19) imply
wU2
 
P 2eL (p0)  u1; and
wU2
 
P 2H (p0)

> u1:
The feasible contract also implies wU1 (PH (p0)) > u1 by corollary 1. I rst list the con-
ditions for all of the possible outcomes after each newly informed depositors decision is
observed.
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1. If the rst informed depositor waits, a herd of non-withdrawals occurs.
PLPH (p0)u2 + (1  PLPH (p0))u2 = p0u2 + (1  p0)u2  u1: (20)
2. If the rst informed depositor withdraws, a herd of withdrawals occurs.
w1
 
PeL (p0) < u1:
3. If the rst informed depositor withdraws, a herd of withdrawals does not occur.
The second depositor follows the signal as PLPeL (p0)u2 +  1  PLPeL (p0)u2 < u1;
guaranteed by (18). The uninformed depositors withdraw if the second depositor
withdraws, and they wait if the second depositor waits.
w1
 
PeL (p0)  u1
w2
 
PHPeL (p0) = u1 + (1  ) PHPeL (p0)u2 +  1  PHPeL (p0)u2  u1(21)
4. If the rst informed depositor waits, a herd of non-withdrawals does not occur.
The second depositor follows the signal. The uninformed depositors withdraw if the
second depositor withdraws, and they wait if the second depositor waits.
p0u2 + (1  p0)u2 < u1; and (22)
u1 + (1  )

PeLPH (p0)u2 +  1  PeLPH (p0)u2 < u1: (23)
5. If the rst informed depositor waits, a herd of non-withdrawals does not occur. The
second depositor follows the signal. The uninformed depositors wait regardless of
the second depositors decision. i.e. (21)  (22) :
The combinations of the above 5 constitute descriptions of equilibrium outcomes given
the contract.
Case I: Combine 1 and 3. A herd of non-withdrawals begins if the rst informed depositor
waits. If the rst informed depositor withdraws and the second also withdraws, then a
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bank run occurs. If the rst withdraws and the second waits, the uninformed depositors
wait.
The probability of bank runs is
1 = (1   (p0))
 
1    PeL (p0) .
Equations (18)   (20) are necessarily required for the outcome. The participation
incentive constraint is
wU0 (p0) =  (p0)w
U
1 (PH (p0)) + (1   (p0))wU1
 
PeL (p0)  u1 (24)
where
wU1
 
PeL (p0) =   PeL (p0) u1 + (1  ) PHPeL (p0)u2 +  1  PHPeL (p0)u2	+ 
1    PeL (p0) 1c1u1 (25)
 u1;
and
wU1 (PH (p0)) = u1 + (1  ) [PH (p0)u2 + (1  PH (p0))u2]  u1; (26)
which is guaranteed by (20) :
The ex-ante expected utility maximization problem is
max
c1;
wU0 (p0)
s:t: c1  1; (18)  (20) ; (24)  (26) :
Case II: Combine 3 and 5. A herd of non-withdrawals does not occur if the rst informed
depositor waits. The second depositor still follows the signal, but the uninformed depos-
itors do not withdraw regardless the second depositors decision. A herd of withdrawals
does not occur after the rst depositor withdraws. If the rst and the second informed
depositors withdraw, then a bank run occurs.
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The probability of bank runs is 1.
The conditions for the outcome are (18)   (19) ; (21)   (22), and (24)   (26) ; where
(26) is guaranteed by (21) in this case.
The ex-ante expected utility maximization problem is
max
c1;
wU0 (p0)
s:t: c1  1; (18)  (19) ; (21)  (22) ; and (24)  (26) :
Case III: Combine 1 and 2. A herd of withdrawals begins if the rst informed depositor
withdraws. If the rst informed depositor waits, a herd of non-withdrawals begins.
The probability of bank runs is
2 = 1   (p0) :
Equations (18)  (20) ; and (24) are necessarily required for the outcome. In addition,
the participation incentive constraint requires:
wU0 (p0) =  (p0)w
U
1 (PH (p0)) + (1   (p0))wU1
 
PeL (p0)  u1
where
wU1 (PH (p0)) = u1 + (1  ) [PH (p0)u2 + (1  PH (p0))u2]  u1; (27)
is guaranteed by (20) ; and
wU1
 
PeL (p0) = 1c1u1;
requires

 
PeL (p0) u1 + (1  ) PHPeL (p0)u2 +  1  PHPeL (p0)u2	+ 1    PeL (p0) 1c1u1 < u1:
(28)
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The ex-ante expected utility maximization problem is
max
c1;
wU0 (p0)
s:t:c1  1; (18)  (20) ; (24) ; and (27)  (28) :
Case IV: Combine 2 and 5. A herd of withdrawals starts if the rst informed depositor
withdraws. If the rst informed depositor waits, the second depositor still follows the
signal. However, the uninformed depositors do not withdraw regardless of the second
depositors decision.
The probability of bank runs is 2.
The conditions for the outcome are (18)   (19) ; (21)   (22) ; (24) and (27)   (28) ;
where (27) is guaranteed by (21) :
The ex-ante expected utility maximization problem is
max
c1;
w0 (p0)
s:t:c1  1; (18)  (19) ; (21)  (22) ; (24) ; (27)  (28) :
Case V: Combine 2 and 4. A herd of withdrawals starts if the rst informed depositor
withdraws. If the rst informed depositor waits, the second depositor still follows the
signal. The uninformed depositors wait if the second depositor waits, and they withdraw
if the second depositor withdraws.
The probability of bank runs is
3 = 1   (p0) +  (p0) (1   (PH (p0)))
Equations (14) ; (18)  (19), and (22)  (24) are necessarily required for the outcome.
The participation incentive constraint requires:
wU0 (p0) =  (p0)w
U
1 (PH (p0)) + (1   (p0))wU1
 
PeL (p0)  u1
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where
wU1 (PH (p0)) =  (PH (p0))

v1 + (1  )

P 2H (p0)u2 +
 
1  P 2H (p0)

u2
	
+ (29)
(1   (PH (p0))) 1c1u1
 u1:
Also,
wU1
 
PeL (p0) = 1c1u1;
which is guaranteed by (23) :
The ex-ante expected utility maximization problem is
max
c1;
wU0 (p0)
s:t:c1  1, (18)  (19) ; (22)  (24) ; (29) :
6.3 An Example of an Economy with Two Depositors
In this section, I will present the model in a 2-depositor, 2-stage version. I follow the
setup in section 2 except that there are only two stages. One of the two depositors will be
informed about his consumption type as well as the productivity status at the beginning
of stage 1, and the other will be informed only about his consumption type at stage 2.
Both depositors have equal probability to be the rst informed depositor ex ante. The 2-
depositor, 2-stage setup is the simplest case which allows for herding runs. The deadline
for the decision in period 1 is the end of stage 2. Depositor 1 (the depositor who is
informed at stage 1) does not have the chance to revise his decision after observing the
decision by the other. But he can delay his decision until stage 2. If both depositors
are active at stage 2, they will make decisions simultaneously. R > 1 and R < 1: For
convenience, the signal about production is assumed to be perfect (q = 1). As there are
only two depositors, there is no need for depositor 2 to make decision before he receives
his signal about consumption.
The bank announces the demand-deposit contract which describes the payment to the
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depositor who withdraws in period 1, c1; and the amount of resource kept in storage,
. The bank liquidates either all or none of the assets in production, and liquidates the
assets only when it cannot meet the payment demands. If c1 > 1, the depositor who
withdraws second will not receive the full amount of c1: So let c1 (1) and c2 (2) denote the
payment received by depositors who withdraws rst and second in period 1, respectively.
Let c2 (x1 + x2; R) denote the payment in period 2 conditional on the total withdrawals
in period 1 and the realization of production.
To comply with the assumption in section 3, I assume that given c1 < 1, depositor 1
always delays his decision until stage 2, and that depositor 2 cannot obtain any information
from depositor 1s action at stage 1. Depositors play a simultaneous-move game if both
are active at stage 2. I rst illustrate the equilibrium given c1  1, then the one given
c1 < 1:
6.3.1 Equilibrium given c1  1
When c1  1; the equilibrium strategies include: (1) depositor 1s strategy when he
receives signals at stage 1; (2) depositor 2s strategy contingent on depositor 1s decision
at stage 2.
I begin with depositor 2s strategy at stage 2. At stage 2, depositor 2 has an updated
belief p2. If he waits, he expects p2u
 
c2
 
x1; R

+ (1  p2)u (c2 (x1; R)), while if he
withdraws, he will get u (c1 (x1 + 1)) :It is easy to see that there exists a cuto¤ belief
p^2 (x1) above which the depositor waits, below which he withdraws. p^2 is contingent on
x1, as depositor 2s expected payo¤s vary with depositor 1s decision.
If a contract species c1 = 1 and  = 2, depositor 1 does not have the incentive to
withdraw if a low signal is received. Except for such a contract, withdrawing immediately
is depositor 1s best response regardless of the decision of other depositors if a low signal
is received given c1 > 1,
Given c1  1, an acceptable contract must satisfy the following condition: If the
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productivity is known to be high, both depositors are willing to wait ex ante. That is,
2
 
0:5u
 
c1 (1)

+ 0:5u
 
c1 (2)

+ (1  )2 u  c2  0; R+ (30)
+2 (1  ) 0:5u  c1 (1)+ u  0:5c2  1; R  u (1) :
If a high signal is received, depositor 1 will always have the incentive to wait if he can
convey the high signal to depositor 2 because
u
 
c2
 
1; R

+ (1  )u  c2  0; R  u (1)
by (30).
In this simplest setup, there is a perfect Bayesian equilibrium in the post-deposit game
given any contract that provides c1  1. That is,
1. If c1 = 1 and  = 2, depositors 1 and 2 withdraw if and only if they are impatient.
Depositor 1s belief is updated by the signal received. Depositor 2s belief does not
change. This contract results in the same welfare level as in autarky.
2. If c1 > 1 or  6= 2, depositor 1 withdraws if he is impatient and/or a low signal
is received, and does not otherwise. Depositor 2 has the updated belief P~L (p0)
(PH (p0 = 1)) if depositor 1 withdraws (does not withdraw). Depositor 2 withdraws
if he is impatient and/or his updated belief is below p^2 (x1).
6.3.2 Equilibrium given c1 < 1
When c1 < 1 is provided (c1 (1) = c1 (2) = c1), depositor 1 and 2 play a simultaneous-move
game at stage 2 if depositor 1 is still active (patient). Depositor 1 knows the productivity
status but does not know depositor 2s type. Depositor 2 does not know the productivity
status but knows depositor 1 is patient. In this game at stage 2, there exist Bayesian Nash
equilibria. There are four possible equilibrium outcomes, depending on the parameters
and contract.
1. u (c2 (1; R))+(1  )u (c2 (0; R)) < u (c1) and p0u
 
c2
 
0; R

+(1  p0)u (c2 (1; R)) 
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u (c1): Depositor 1 withdraws if he has received a low signal, and does not otherwise.
Depositor 2 withdraws if he is impatient, and does not otherwise.
2. u (c2 (1; R)) < u (c1) and p0u
 
c2
 
0; R

+ (1  p0)u (c2 (1; R)) < u (c1): Depositor
1 withdraws if he has received a low signal, and does not otherwise. Depositor 2
withdraws.
3. u (c2 (1; R))  u (c1) and p0u
 
c2
 
0; R

+ (1  p0)u (c2 (0; R)) < u (c1): Depositor
1 does not withdraw. Depositor 2 withdraws.
4. u (c2 (1; R))+(1  )u (c2 (0; R))  u (c1) and p0u
 
c2
 
0; R

+(1  p0)u (c2 (0; R)) 
u (c1): Depositor 1 does not withdraw. Depositor 2 withdraws if he is impatient,
and does not withdraws.
Note that there exists multiple equilibria given some parameter values. Also note that
depositor 1 always has incentive to wait if he has received a high signal as c1 < 1 and
c2
 
1; R

> 1.
At stage 1, depositor 1 withdraws if he is impatient. If depositor 1 has withdrawn,
depositor 2 withdraws at stage 2 if p0u
 
c2
 
1; R

+ (1  p0)u (c2 (1; R)) < u (c1) and/or
he is impatient, and does not otherwise.
6.3.3 A Numerical Example
In this example, I will employ the following utility function and parameters: u (c) =
(c+b)1  b1 
1  ; b = 0:001;  = 1:01; R = 1:25; R = 0:95; p0 = 0:95; q = 1;  = 0:05:
Table 3: Optimal Contract - 2-depositor, 2-stage
c1  w0 (p0)
Best contract that provides c1 > 1 or  6= 2 1 0 7:3439
Contract that provides c1 = 1 and  = 2 (Autarky) 1 2 7:1529
Best contract that provides c1 < 1 1:0000 0 7:3439
The contract that provides c1 = 1 and  = 2 (equivalent to autarky) yields the ex-
ante expected utility of 7:1529. The optimal contract in this example requires c1 = 1
and  = 0. As the liquidity demand is small ( is small) and the production has high
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probability to be successful, the bank invests all resources in production. The ex-ante
expected utility is 7:3439. Given c1 = 1 and  = 0, depositor 1 withdraws at stage 1 if
and only if a low signal is received or he is impatient, depositor 2 withdraws at stage 2
if depositor 1 has withdrawn at stage 1 or he is impatient, and does not otherwise. (If
depositor 1 has withdrawn, depositor 2 is indi¤erent between withdrawing immediately
at stage 2 and waiting until t = 2:) When productivity is low, depositor 1s withdrawal
forces the bank to liquidate all its assets so depositor 2 also benets from depositor 1s
private information. Of course, if either of the depositors is impatient, the bank has to
interrupt production. However, the probability of having a liquidity shock is small enough
to be tolerated. The best contract in the category of c1 = 1 provides c1 very close to 1,
and the bank also invests all resources in production. The ex-ante expected utility is very
close to 7:3439: Given this contract, depositor 1 withdraws in stage 1 if he is impatient,
depositor 2 does not withdraw at stage 1. At stage 2, depositor 1 withdraws if he has
received a low signal and wait otherwise. Depositor 2 withdraws if he is impatient and
does not otherwise.
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